Research

Published (and other available) papers (on RePec) 

• “Payments and Privacy in the Digital Economy,” (2025) Journal of Financial Economics 169, with Toni Ahnert and Peter Hoffmann. 
• “Distributed Ledgers and the Governance of Money,” (2025) Journal of Financial Economics 167, with Raphael Auer and Hyun Song Shin.
• “Fragility under joint financing: The (moral) hazards of diversification,” (2025) Journal of Economic Theory 225, with Vincent Maurin and Piero Gottardi.
• “The Economics of Central Bank Digital Currency,” (2024) International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 20(4), pages 221-274, with  Toni Ahnert, Katrin Assenmacher, Peter Hoffmann, Agnese Leonello and Davide Porcellacchia.
• “Diamond-Dybvig and beyond: On the Instability of Banking,” (2023) European Economic Review 154, with Chao Gu, Ed Nosal, and Randall Wright.
• “CBDC: Information and Stability,” (2022) Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 142, with Tod Keister.
• “Central bank digital currencies: motives, economic implications, and the research frontier,” (2022) Annual Reviews of Economics, with Raphael Auer, Jon Frost, Leo Gambacorta, Tara Rice and Hyun Song Shin.
• “Optimal Financial Exclusion,” (2021) American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 13(4), 101-34, with Erwan Quintin.
• “The Collateral Cost of Clearing,” (2021) Journal of Money Credit and Banking 53(5),939-970, with Thomas Nellen.
• “Dealers’ Insurance, Market Structure, and Liquidity,” (2020) Journal of Financial Economics, 138(3), 725-753, with Francesca Carapella,
• “Relationships In The Interbank Market”, (2020) Review of Economic Dynamics 35, 170-191, with Jonathan Chiu and Jens Eisenshmidt.
• “A Theory of Repurchase Agreements, Collateral Re-use, and Repo Intermediation” (2019), Review of Economic Dynamics 33, 30-56 with Vincent Maurin and Piero Gottard
• Rational Opacity ” (2017) Review of Financial Studies 30, December, with Erwan Quintin
  • We study why some corporations are more opaque than they could be.

• Limited disclosure and hidden orders in asset markets (with Erwan Quintin) Journal of Financial Economics, 2017
  • The optimal organization of asset markets is characterized by hidden orders of expert investors and limited disclosure from the originators of assets to induce participation of non-experts. 
• A search-based model of the interbank money market and monetary policy implementation (with Morten Bech) Journal of Economic Theory, 2016
  • A simple model to understand the effects of monetary policy implementation, including large excess reserves, on the interbank market.
• Monetary Emissions Trading Mechanisms (with Ted Temzelides) International Journal of Game Theory, 2016
  • We use insights from dynamic mechanism design in monetary economics to derive properties of optimal dynamic emissions trading mechanisms. 
• Private Money and Banking Regulation (with Daniel Sanches) Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 2015
  • How to regulate banking to achieve an efficient supply of liquidity?

• Efficient Contract Enforcement (with Thor Koeppl and Erwan Quintin) Economic Theory, 2014
  • When the choice of institutions is endogenous what is the impact of inequality on the quality of institutions and ultimately on growth. 

• Endogenous Credit Cycles (with Chao Gu, Fabrizio Mattesini and Randy Wright) Journal of Political Economy, 2013
  • How endogenous credit limit can create exotic and interesting dynamics. 

• Banking: A new monetarist approach (with Chao Gu, Fabrizio Mattesini and Randy Wright) Review of Economic Studies, 2013
  • A mechanism approach to banking that emphasizes limited commitment.
• The Impact of Unconventional Monetary Policy on the Overnight Interbank Market (with Morten Bech)  Reserve Bank of Australia 2013 Annual Conference Volume on “Liquidity and Funding Markets”
  • We review different models of the overnight interbank market in light of the recent unconventional monetary policy. 
• Money Talks (with Marie Hoerova and Ted Temzelides) Economic Letters, 2012
  • We study credible information transmission by a benevolent short-lived central bank. Information transmission through monetary policy creates a distortion, thus, lending credibility. 
• Central Counterparty Clearing and Systemic Risk Insurance in OTC Derivatives Markets (with Thor Koeppl) Revue d’Economie Financiere – The Unregulated Finance – 2012
  • We argue that CCP clearing derivatives should require contributions to a systemic risk funds which goes beyond the standard collateral requirements (default funds, initial and variation margins). 

Unpublished papers

• “Pricing Liquidity Support: A PLB for Switzerland” (with Dirk Niepelt and Remo Taudien)
  • The proposed revision of the Swiss Banking Act introduces a public liquidity backstop (PLB) for distressed systemically important banks (SIBs), in part to facilitate resolution. We examine the impact of the PLB on fiscal balances, societal welfare, and the incentives of bank shareholders and management. A PLB, like too-big-to-fail (TBTF) status, acts as a subsidy for non-convertible bonds, which can create negative externalities. Corrective measures must be implemented before the PLB is activated to align incentives with societal interests. We conservatively estimate that Swiss SIBs’ TBTF status results in funding cost reductions far greater than the proposed ex-ante compensation, with UBS Group AG alone gaining at least USD 2.9 billion in 2022. The risk for Switzerland of hosting SIBs warrants additional precautionary savings.
• A Theory of Repurchase Agreements, Collateral Re-Use and Repo Intermediation (with Piero Gottardi and Vincent Maurin)
  • We show that repurchase agreements (repos) arise as the instrument of choice to borrow in a competitive model with limited commitment. In equilibrium, lenders choose to re-use collateral. This increases the circulation of the asset and generates a “collateral multiplier” effect. Intermediation by dealers may endogenously arise in equilibrium, with chains of repos among traders. 
• The Emergence and Future of Central Counterparties (with Thor Koeppl)
  • We present a model of central counterparty clearing and derive some policy implications if regulations are put in place. 
• Why Rent When You Can Buy : A Theory of Repurchase Agreements (with Borghan Narajabad)
  • We show that repos are redundant in Walrasian markets. With bilateral trading, repos help restore efficiency. We obtain testable results on prices and market volumes. 
• Endogenous adverse selection, market discipline, and central bank lending (with Marie Hoerova)What is the role of a central bank when market discipline is effective?